

EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS FOR STOCHASTIC REPEATED SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS

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SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS

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Second Price auctions *used to be* the main mechanism for Real Time Bidding. The mechanism proceeds as follows:

- An item ([an ad placement linked to a user](#)) is auctioned.
- Bidders place their bids for this specific item.
- The highest bidder wins the auction. She pays the second highest bid and observes the value of the item ([possibly the occurrence of a click or a purchase](#)).

A NICE PROPERTY OF SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS

How much should you bid in a second price auction, knowing your value ?

Notation: $v :=$ known value, $m :=$ max of the adversaries' bids.

Intuition: Bidding on the right side of m ensures the maximal utility.

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Losing means bidding less than m .

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Theorem

Second price auctions are truthful.

Setting For t in $1, \dots, T$,

1. the bidder submits her bid B_t for the item that is of unknown value V_t . The other players submit their bids, the maximum of which is called M_t .
2. If $M_t \leq B_t$ (which includes the case of ties), the bidder observes and receives V_t , and pays M_t . Otherwise, the bidder loses the auction and does not observe V_t .

Further assumptions $\{V_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ are iid random variables in $[0,1]$; their expectation is denoted by $\mathbb{E}(V_t) = v$.

The maximal bids $\{M_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ are iid random variables in $[0, 1]$; their cdf is denoted by F .

Same setting as in [Weed et al.(2016)Weed, Perchet, and Rigollet].

Regret

$$R_T := \max_{b \in [0,1]} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}[U_t(b)] - \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}[U_t(B_t)].$$

where the utility is $U_t(b) = (V_t - M_t)1\{b \geq M_t\}$

Remarks on the setting

- The stochastic assumption is arguably a reasonable assumption for RTB auctions.
- Reserve prices are not considered, because the setting of a reserve price r is equivalent to adding a bidder who constantly bids r .
- Morally, $V_t \sim Ber(v)$ where v is small

SOME INTUITION ON THE PROBLEM

A structured bandit problem.

Exploration/Exploitation Trade-Off where Exploitation consists in bidding close to v and Exploration consists in bidding high (bidding 1 means observing everything).

UCB-TYPE ALGORITHMS

UCB algorithms are a natural solution for balancing exploration / exploitation.

$$B_t = UCB_t(\gamma) = \begin{cases} \min \left(1, \bar{V}_{t-1} + \sqrt{\frac{\gamma \log(t)}{2N_{t-1}}} \right) & \text{for UCBID [Weed et al.(2016)Weed, Perchet, and Rigollet]} \\ \inf \left\{ x \in (\bar{V}_{t-1}, 1] : kl(\bar{V}_{t-1}, x) = \frac{\gamma \log(t)}{N_{t-1}} \right\} & \text{for klUCBID} \\ \min \left(1, \bar{V}_{t-1} + \sqrt{\frac{2\bar{W}_{t-1} \log(3t^\gamma)}{N_{t-1}}} + \frac{3 \log(3t^\gamma)}{N_{t-1}} \right) & \text{for BernsteinUCBID,} \end{cases}$$

GUARANTEES ON UCBID

Locally bounded density. There exists $\Delta > 0$ such that F admits a density f bounded on $[v, v + \Delta]$, i.e., there exists $\beta > 0$, such that $\forall x \in [v, v + \Delta], f(x) < \beta$.

Theorem

If $F(v) > 0$, then the regret of the UCBID algorithm with parameter $\gamma > 1$ is bounded as follows:

$$R_T \leq \frac{2\beta\gamma}{F(v)} \log^2 T + O(\log T).$$

Remark: $\frac{1}{F(v)} \sim$ average time between two successive observations under the optimal policy

Theorem

If $F(v) \neq 0$, the *kl-UCBID* algorithm with parameter $\gamma > 1$ yields the following bound on the regret:

$$R_T \leq 8\gamma \frac{v(1-v)}{F(v)} \log^2(T) (1 + o(1)) .$$

whereas the *Bernstein-UCBID* algorithm with parameter $\gamma > 1$ yields the following bound on the regret:

$$R_T \leq 8\gamma \frac{w}{F(v)} \log^2(T) + O(\log T),$$

where w is the variance.

Theorem

Without further assumption, the maximal regrets of UCBID and klUCBID are

$O(\sqrt{T} \log T)$. If F has a density that is bounded from below and above by non negative constants, the maximal regret of UCBID remains of the same order, while it is reduced to $O(T^{\frac{1}{3}} \log^2 T)$ for BernsteinUCBID and to $O(\log^2 T)$ for klUCBID.

SIMULATIONS




Figure: Regret plots of three UCB algorithms for values $V_t \sim \text{Ber}(0.2)$ and uniform M_t

SIMULATIONS




Figure: Regret plots of three UCB algorithms for V_t supported on $\{0.195, 0.205\}$ and uniform M_t

SIMULATIONS




Figure: Regret at time 5000 of studied policies for uniform M_t and Bernoulli-distributed V_t of varying mean v .

PARAMETER-DEPENDENT LOWER BOUND

Theorem

We consider all environments where V_t follows a Bernoulli distribution with expectation v and F admits a density f that is bounded from below and above, with $f(b) \geq \beta > 0$. If a strategy is such that, for all such environments, $R_T \leq O(T^a)$, for all $a > 0$, and if there exists $\gamma > 0$ such that for all such environments, $\mathbb{P}(B_t < v) < t^{-\gamma}$, then this strategy must satisfy:

$$\liminf_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{R_T}{\log T} \geq \beta \frac{v(1-v)}{16F(v)}. \quad (1)$$

The [assumption](#) is satisfied by all studied UCB algorithms

INTUITION BEHIND THE PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND

Originality : we consider a different alternative for each of the T time steps.

We fix a model in which all $(V_s)_{s=1}^T$ follow a Bernoulli distribution with expectation v , and the bids $(M_s)_{s=1}^T$ are distributed according to F . At each time t , we consider the alternative model where the values $(V_s)_{s=1}^T$ follow a Bernoulli distribution with expectation

$v'_t = v + \sqrt{\frac{v(1-v)}{F(v)t}}$, and the bids M_t are distributed according to F .

Lemma

If F admits a density f , which satisfies

$$\exists \beta, \forall x \in [0, 1], \beta \leq f(x);$$

Then,

$$\frac{\beta}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}[(B_t - v)^2] \leq R_T.$$

The utility writes

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[U_t(b)] &= \int_0^b (v - m)f(m)dm \\ &= (v - b)F(b) + \int_0^b F(m)dm,\end{aligned}$$

The instantaneous regret writes :

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[r_t(b)] &= \mathbb{E}[U_t(v)] - \mathbb{E}[U_t(b)] \\ &= \int_b^v F(m)dm - (v - b)F(b) \\ &= \int_b^v (F(m) - F(b))dm \\ &= \int_b^v \int_b^m f(u)dudm \geq \beta(v - b)^2\end{aligned}$$

We fix a time step t . Thanks to Le Cam's method,

$$\mathbb{P}_v \left(B_t > \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) + \mathbb{P}_{v'_t} \left(B_t < \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) \geq 1 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \text{KL}(\mathbb{P}_v^{I_t}, \mathbb{P}_{v'_t}^{I_t})}.$$

thanks to the [non-underbidding assumption](#).

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The assumption that $R_T \leq O(T^a)$ allows us to say that $\frac{\mathbb{E}_v[N_t]}{t} \rightarrow 1/F(v)$ thanks to the [non-underbidding assumption](#).

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The assumption that $R_T \leq O(T^\alpha)$ allows us to say that $\frac{\mathbb{E}_v[N_t]}{t} \rightarrow 1/F(v)$

$$\mathbb{P}_v \left(B_t > \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) + \mathbb{P}_{v'_t} \left(B_t < \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) \geq 1 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} kl(v, v'_t) (1 + \epsilon) F(v) t}.$$

thanks to the [non-underbidding assumption](#).

INTUITION BEHIND THE PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND

We fix a time step t . Thanks to Le Cam's method,

$$\mathbb{P}_v \left(B_t > \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) + \mathbb{P}_{v'_t} \left(B_t < \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) \geq 1 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \underbrace{KL(\mathbb{P}_v^{I_t}, \mathbb{P}_{v'_t}^{I_t})}_{kl(v, v'_t) \mathbb{E}_v[N_t]}}.$$

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$$\mathbb{P}_v \left(B_t > \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) + \cancel{\mathbb{P}_{v'_t} \left(B_t < \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right)} \geq 1 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} kl(v, v'_t) (1 + \epsilon) F(v) t} - o(t^{-\gamma})$$

thanks to the [non-underbidding assumption](#).

INTUITION BEHIND THE PROOF OF THE LOWER BOUND

We have proved

$$\mathbb{P}_v \left(B_t > \frac{v + v'_t}{2} \right) \geq 1 - \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \underbrace{kl(v, v'_t)}_{\lesssim \frac{1+\epsilon}{2F(v)t}} (1 + \epsilon) F(v) t - o(t^{-\gamma})}.$$

$$\text{Now, } \mathbb{E}_v[(B_t - v)^2] \geq (v - \frac{v+v'_t}{2})^2 \mathbb{P}_v \left(B_t > \frac{v+v'_t}{2} \right)$$

This, together with the development of $kl(v, v'_t)$ yields

$$\mathbb{E}_v[(B_t - v)^2] \geq \frac{v(1-v)}{4F(v)t} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}(1 + \epsilon) - 1/t^\gamma \right),$$

for t large enough.

$$\liminf_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}_v[(B_t - v)^2]}{\log T} \geq \frac{v(1-v)}{8F(v)}.$$

SIMPLER, NON OVERBIDDING ALGORITHMS

Explore Then Greedy

- Strategies inspired by Explore Then Commit's strategies ETG strategies.
- In the exploration phase, the maximal value of the bid ($B_t = 1$) is chosen to force observation. After a well-chosen stopping time, the bidder chooses either to abandon the bids (choosing $B_t = 0$), or to continue with the running average of observed values (greedy phase).

- **Practical motivation:** In the context of digital advertising, simplicity is critical.
- **Other practical motivation:** ETG strategies are easy to explain and similar to truly implemented strategies.
- **Theoretical motivation:** The lower bound only works for overbidding strategies : can non-overbidding strategies work ?

We propose one instance of ETG, that we call ETGstop, defined by the following choice of stopping times τ_1 and τ_0 :

$$\tau_1 := \inf \left\{ t \in [1, T] : \exp \left(-\frac{tL_t}{8} \right) \leq \frac{1}{T^2} \right\}, \tau_0 = \inf \left\{ t \in [1, T] : U_t \leq \frac{1}{T^{\frac{1}{3}}} \right\} \quad (2)$$

where we denote by $L_t = \min\{v \in [0, \bar{V}_t] : \exp(-tkl(\bar{V}_t, v)) \leq 1/T^2\}$ and by $U_t = \max\{v \in [\bar{V}_t, 1] : \exp(-tkl(\bar{V}_t, v)) \geq 1/T^2\}$ the kl-lower and upper confidence bound for the confidence level $1/T^2$.

IDEA BEHIND THE CHOICE OF STOPPING TIME

Idea : We want to ensure a minimal ratio of won auctions in this second phase.

This choice of stopping time allows to guarantee that with high probability, if τ_1 is smaller than τ_0 , all bids will be larger than $\frac{v}{2}$ in the second phase. Indeed, we prove that for all n ,

$$\mathbb{P}(\bar{V}(n) \leq \frac{v}{2}) \leq \exp(-nkl(v, \frac{v}{2})) \leq \exp(-\frac{nv}{8}),$$

where $\bar{V}(n)$ denotes the empirical mean of the first n observed values. With high probability, $\exp(-\frac{nv}{8}) \leq \exp(-\frac{nL_t}{8}) \leq \frac{1}{T^2}$, for all $n > \tau$, since L_t is a lower confidence bound of v . Therefore, the probability that there exists a time step in the second phase for which the average of the observed values is less than $v/2$ is small.

Theorem

If F admits a density f , that satisfies

$\exists \beta, \beta > 0, \forall x \in [0, 1], \beta \leq f(x) \leq \beta$, then the regret of ETG_{stop} satisfies :

$$\max_{v \in [0, 1]} R_T(v) \leq O(T^{\frac{1}{3}} \log^2 T),$$

and if $v > \frac{1}{T^{\frac{1}{3}}}$,

$$\text{then } R_T(v) \leq 7 + \frac{64 \log(T) + 60T^{-1/2}}{v} + \frac{4}{F(v/2)} + \beta \frac{\log^2 T}{F(v/2)}.$$

THE LIMITATION OF ETG STRATEGIES

Theorem

If F admits a density lower-bounded by $\beta > 0$, then the regret of any ETG strategy satisfies

$$\max_{v \in [0,1]} R_T(v) \geq \frac{\beta}{4} \left(T^{\frac{1}{3}} - 1 \right). \quad (3)$$

SIMULATIONS

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


Figure: Comparison with ETGstop and other algorithms, for $V_t \sim \text{Ber}(0.3)$ and uniform M_t .

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


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J. Weed, V. Perchet, and P. Rigollet.

Online learning in repeated auctions.

In *Conference on Learning Theory*, pages 1562–1583, 2016.